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Summary
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has released two reports on
a la carte pricing of cable television networks that reach contradictory conclusions.
On November 24, 2004, then-chairman Michael Powell issued a report (Initial
Report) that concluded that requiring cable and satellite operators to offer cable
networks in an a la carte fashion – either as a replacement for the current expanded
basic service tier or as an optional alternative to that tier – would likely increase the
monthly cable or satellite bill for most households and reduce program diversity.  On
February 9, 2006, current FCC chairman Kevin Martin released a “Further Report”
that appears to contradict the first one, concluding that for the 40% of cable
households (and 100% of satellite households) that already receive digital service,
a la carte purchasing is likely to lower the monthly bill.  Neither of these reports was
supported by the full Commission and each was released as an unofficial report.
These inconsistent findings by the expert agency have caused some confusion.  
Neither report is based on a model developed by the FCC itself.  Rather, each
made relatively minor modifications to a model and study performed by Booz Allen
Hamilton Inc. for the National Cable & Telecommunications Association.  Yet, as
Booz Allen explicitly recognizes, there is significant “uncertainty involved in
building an economic model for a la carte,” partly because of the large number of
potential interactions and responses by consumers, program networks, and cable and
satellite operators that must be modeled, and partly because of the lack of empirical
data, especially on the response of households to different a la carte prices per
channel.  Given the lack of data, Booz Allen was not able to use standard economic
methodology; rather it had to employ an indirect approach and rely on a number of
potentially challengeable assumptions about how households, cable and satellite
operators, and program networks would behave.  This indirect approach could not be
avoided.  But given their reliance on a host of assumptions that were of necessity
formed in the absence of comprehensive empirical data, neither the Booz Allen study
nor the two FCC reports should be viewed as providing definitive results.  It appears,
however, that most of the criticisms of the Initial Report that are presented in the
Further Report either are not supported by available market data or cannot be proven
one way or the other.
  
Large tiers generally benefit those households that prefer a wide variety of
programming and/or niche programming; a la carte pricing generally benefits those
households that watch only a small number of networks and prefer general interest
programming, but could have serious implications for diversity.   Requiring operators
to offer all options might not meet the needs of all households, however, because the
migration of some threshold number of households to a la carte pricing could
undermine the economic feasibility of large tiers. 
Technological change and the mandatory transition to digital television in 2009
are likely to precipitate new market dynamics and ultimately the current tiered
business model may well give way to a video on demand approach that is akin to a
la carte pricing.  This report will not be updated.
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1  Under a la carte pricing, cable (or satellite) television subscribers could purchase
individually each cable network carried by their cable (or satellite) operator.  Currently,
virtually all cable system operators make cable networks available to customers only in a
limited number of large tiers.  Although many cable and satellite operators that are not
heavily vertically integrated backward into program networks or program production would
like the discretion to offer networks in an a la carte fashion or in small tiers as well as in
large tiers, they claim that the pricing imposed by the major programmers (demanding much
higher per subscriber fees if the network is not provided to a high percentage of an
operator’s subscribers) makes it financially prohibitive to offer their subscribers a la carte
or small tier options.  (See, for example, the Testimony of James O. Robbins, president, Cox
Communications, Inc., before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, March 25, 2004, and the Statement of Matt Polka, president, American
Cable Association, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, January 31, 2006.)  As a result virtually all subscribers have the following
choices:
– The basic service tier, typically consisting of a package of local stations (local broadcast
stations and public, educational, and governmental (PEG) access programming) plus a few
advertiser-supported cable networks.
– The expanded basic service tier, consisting on average of 36 advertiser-supported cable
networks.  This tier typically includes many of the most popular cable networks, ranging
from Nickelodeon and the Discovery Channel to MTV.  Since approximately 90% of
subscribers purchase the expanded basic service tier, most customers have this enhanced
basic service tier in mind when they talk of “basic service.”
– Various premium tiers, typically consisting of a small package of “premium” program
networks (such as HBO and Showtime), usually offered without commercial advertising.
– Pay-per-view channels with programming (first-run movies, live concerts, boxing
matches, sexually-explicit programming) that subscribers pay for on a program-by-program
basis.
– In addition, responding to congressional pressure, most cable operators have begun
offering a family tier that is smaller and lower-priced than the expanded basic service tier
and consists  of networks with programming targeted to families with children.
  Cable operators require subscribers to purchase the basic service tier in order to
purchase any other tiers or channels.  Most tiers are available in either analog or digital
format, but digital tiers tend to offer additional purchasing options as well as high definition
video.  The direct broadcast satellite (DBS) distributors of multi-channel television also
offer the bulk of advertiser-supported networks on a single tier, analogous to cable’s
expanded basic service tier, with additional premium tiers and pay-per-channel
programming available.
The FCC’s “a la Carte” Reports
Overview
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) has released
two reports on a la carte pricing of cable television networks1 that reach contradictory
conclusions.  On November 24, 2004, then-chairman Michael Powell issued a report
(Initial Report) that concluded that requiring cable and satellite operators to offer
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2  Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Report on the Packaging and Sale
of Video Programming Services to the Public, released November 18, 2004, at p. 6. 
3 Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Further Report on the Packaging
and Sale of Video Programming Services to the Public, released February 9, 2006, at p. 4.
4  Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., The a la Carte Paradox: Higher Consumer Costs and Reduced
Programming Diversity (Booz Allen study), July 2004, submitted to the FCC as Attachment
A to Comments filed by NCTA on July 15, 2004, in MB Docket No. 04-207.
5  Booz Allen study at pp. 18-19.
cable networks in an a la carte fashion – either as a replacement for the current
expanded basic service tier or as an optional alternative to that tier – would likely
increase the monthly cable or satellite bill for most households and reduce program
diversity.2  On February 9, 2006, current FCC chairman Kevin Martin released a
“Further Report” that appears to contradict the first one, concluding that for the 40%
of cable households (and 100% of satellite households) that already receive digital
service, a la carte purchasing is likely to lower the monthly bill.3  Neither of these
reports was supported by the full Commission and each was released as an unofficial
report.  These inconsistent findings by the expert agency have caused some confusion
about whether imposing an a la carte regulatory requirement would benefit
consumers.  The purpose of this report is to explain how these two reports reached
differing conclusions and to analyze the different assumptions and calculations used
in each.
Neither report is based on a model developed by the Commission itself.  Rather,
the Initial Report made relatively minor modifications to some input values in a
model and study performed by Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. (Booz Allen) for the
National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA), which submitted the
study as an attachment to its filing in the Commission’s proceeding on a la carte
pricing.4  The results presented in the Initial Report were prepared by re-running the
Booz Allen study with the changed parameter values.  The Further Report challenged
some of the calculations and assumptions used in the Initial Report and re-ran part
of the model to show the impact on the model results of changing several of those
parameter values.
As a result, both the Initial Report and the Further Report are affected by the
limitations of the Booz Allen study.  Yet, as Booz Allen explicitly recognizes, there
is significant “uncertainty involved in building an economic model for a la carte,”
partly because of the large number of potential interactions and responses by
consumers, program networks, and cable and satellite operators that must be
modeled, and partly because of the lack of empirical data, especially on the response
of households to different a la carte prices per channel.5  Given the lack of data, Booz
Allen was not able to use standard economic methodology; rather it had to employ
an indirect approach and rely on a number of potentially challengeable assumptions
about how households, cable and satellite operators, and program networks would
behave.  This indirect approach could not be avoided.  But given their reliance on a
host of assumptions that were of necessity formed in the absence of comprehensive
empirical data, neither the Booz Allen study nor the two FCC reports – which present
results generated by re-running the Booz Allen study with minor calculation
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6  On May 18, 2004, House Commerce Committee chairman, Joe Barton, ranking member,
John Dingell, Telecommunications Subcommittee chairman, Fred Upton,
Telecommunications Subcommittee ranking member, Edward Markey, and Representative
Nathan Deal sent a detailed letter to then-FCC chairman Powell asking the FCC to perform
a study, within six months, that would provide information needed to make an informed
decision on the potential merits and drawbacks of proposals to allow cable and satellite
operators to offer programming to their subscribers on an a la carte or themed-tier basis.
They asked the FCC to determine the extent to which cable and satellite operators had the
option of purchasing individual cable networks and of offering them to subscribers on an
a la carte basis; to study the likely impact of a la carte and themed-tier offerings on retail
rates; to investigate the likely impact of a la carte and themed-tier offerings on advertising
(continued...)
corrections and parameter values tweaked – should be viewed as providing definitive
results.
Also, neither the Booz Allen study nor the two FCC reports attempt to perform
quantitative analysis of alternative policy options that might affect the availability
and pricing of cable networks.  These include:
! requiring program networks to make their networks available to
cable and satellite system operators on an a la carte basis, but
continuing to give those operators the discretion to offer service as
they see fit (i.e., in large tiers only, or with a la carte or small tier
options).
! prohibiting broadcasters that also own cable networks from requiring
cable and satellite operators to carry those cable networks in order
to receive retransmission consent to carry the broadcast
programming.  
! prohibiting the current program network practice of contractually
imposing strict non-disclosure requirements on cable and satellite
operators concerning the subscriber fees they are charged.  This
practice denies operators access to information on the prices paid by
other operators and therefore places them at a negotiating
disadvantage vis-a-vis the networks.
Despite the limitations in the Booz Allen study, it is possible to compare the two
FCC reports.  As will be discussed below, it appears that most of the criticisms of the
Initial Report that are presented in the Further Report either are not supported by
available market data or cannot be proven one way or the other.
Conclusions of the Initial Report
In May 2004, leaders in both the House and Senate Commerce Committees
asked the Federal Communications Commission to collect information and perform
analysis relating to a la carte pricing of cable networks.6  In response to these
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revenues; to investigate the impact of the current retransmission consent process on
consumers’ ability to select their own programming; to investigate the likely impact of a la
carte or themed-tier offerings on the diversity of programming; to study the unique
characteristics of rural and smaller markets; to estimate how many households would have
to invest in set-top boxes in order to receive a la carte or themed-tier offerings; and to study
what legal issues might arise if Congress decided to mandate a la carte purchasing.  (Letter
dated May 18, 2004, from Reps. Barton, Dingell, Upton, Markey, and Deal to FCC
Chairman Michael Powell.)  On May 19, 2004, then-Senate Commerce Committee chairman
John McCain sent a letter to then-chairman Michael Powell urging the FCC “to use any
existing authority you have to promote, or to create incentives to promote, an a la carte
pricing option, in conjunction with whatever tiers cable and satellite companies already
offer.”  (Letter dated May 19, 2004, from Senator John McCain to FCC Chairman Michael
Powell.)
7  FCC Public Notice, “Comment Requested on a la Carte and Themed Tier Programming
and Pricing Options for Programming Distribution on Cable Television and Direct
Broadcast Satellite Systems,” MB Docket No. 04-207, DA 04-104, May 25, 2004.
8  See Initial Report at Appendix C and Appendix D.
9  FCC Public Notice, “Media Bureau Announces Speakers for Symposium on “a la Carte”
MVPD Pricing,” MB Docket No. 04-207, July 13, 2004.
requests, the FCC initiated a docket seeking public comment on “factual questions
regarding the provision of a la carte and theme-tiered services on cable television and
direct broadcast satellite systems.”7  Substantive comments were filed by more than
70 interested parties; 12 economic analyses were attached to these comments.8  The
Initial Report summarized the comments and analysis submitted.  It also incorporated
statements made by expert witnesses at an a la carte symposium sponsored by the
FCC’s Media Bureau.9  The FCC did not undertake an empirical study of its own;
rather, it performed analysis by modifying some of the assumptions and parameter
values in the Booz Allen study and reported how those changes affected the results.
It did not, however, give a full explanation of all the changes it made to the Booz
Allen study to reach its own empirical conclusions.
The major conclusions of the Initial Report (at pp. 6-7) were:
! an a la carte requirement likely would increase operational expenses
for multichannel video program distributors (MVPDs) in three main
areas: (1) equipment and infrastructure; (2) customer service
operations; and (3) billing and back office support.
! unless constrained by regulation, many of these increased costs
would likely be passed on to subscribers, resulting in higher
subscriber fees.
! under an a la carte mandate, networks formerly sold in tiers would
need to significantly increase their marketing expenses to induce
consumers to affirmatively select the network.
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! any type of a la carte requirement would have a significant negative
effect on a program network’s advertising revenues and license fee
structure.  This may cause many program networks to fail, thus
adversely affecting diversity.  The most likely to feel the brunt of
such a mandate would be networks serving small niche interests,
such as religious programming, programming aimed at minority
interests, arts programming, and independently owned networks.
The impact on program networks seems likely under either a
mandatory or a voluntary a la carte regime.
! under a mandatory a la carte purchasing requirement, only those
households that would purchase fewer than 9 advertiser-supported
cable networks might see a reduction in their monthly cable bill.
Households that purchase at least 9 such networks would likely face
an increase in their monthly bills.  Today, the average cable
household watches approximately 11 advertiser-supported cable
networks (plus 6 broadcast channels carried by their cable operator)
in a week.  If the average household purchased each of the 11
advertiser-supported cable networks under an a la carte regime, it
likely would face an increase in its monthly bill under a la carte
purchasing of between 14% and 30%.
! public policy should focus on creating incentives for more MVPD
competition in the marketplace, and for fostering video on demand,
digital video recorders, and video over internet protocol that give the
public more control over their video choices.
! broadcasters that also are producers of cable programming, in their
retransmission consent negotiations with cable and satellite
operators, sometimes tie access to their popular broadcasting
programming to the purchase and carriage of less attractive or less
desired cable network, which may be anticompetitive and harm
consumers.  But the antitrust authorities, not the FCC, are best
positioned to remedy this situation.
Conclusions of the Further Report
On February 9, 2006, current chairman Martin released the Further Report,
which challenged many of the assumptions underlying the Initial Report and
identified an alleged methodological error in the Initial Report.  The Further Report,
like the Initial Report, was not adopted by the full Commission.  The Further Report
presented results from rerunning the original model, but using parameter values
reflecting different underlying assumptions and correcting for the alleged
methodological error in the Initial Report.  With these changes, the Further Report
found (at pp. 4-5) that:
! under a la carte, the 40% of cable households and 100% of satellite
households that already get digital service (and thus do not have to
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make an additional payment for a set-top box) could receive as many
as 20 channels (14 advertiser-supported cable networks plus 6 local
broadcast stations) without seeing an increase in their monthly bills.
This is 3 more than the 17 channels that the average household
watches in a week.
! if a household already gets digital service, under a la carte pricing it
could purchase 11 advertiser-supported cable networks (plus 6 local
broadcast stations) and face a change in its bill ranging from a 13%
decrease to a 4% increase, with a decrease in 3 out of 4 cases.
! a la carte pricing may be even more favorable to consumers than the
model results suggest because the Booz Allen study incorrectly
assumes that a shift to a la carte pricing would cause households to
watch 2 hours less television per day, which would represent an
almost 25% decrease in viewing.  Under the more appropriate
assumption that viewing would not decrease substantially,
advertising revenues are unlikely to fall substantially, licensing fees
are unlikely to increase substantially, and therefore households could
purchase additional a la carte channels without paying more than
under the current expanded basic tier regime.
! bundling may drive up retail prices, making video programming less
affordable and causing some consumers not to purchase MVPD
services.  A la carte and increased themed tiers could give
consumers the opportunity to lower their cable bills by purchasing
fewer channels or smaller packages.
! a la carte pricing could make it easier for some new networks to
enter the market because advertisers and cable distributors might
find it easier to judge the value of smaller networks if consumers
were able to express their interests through subscriptions.
! a la carte pricing might provide programming that households value
more than tiered programming because it might result in more
programming that is highly valued by a niche audience and/or more
general interest programming that is widely valued.
The Further Report specifically concludes that a “mixed bundling” alternative, in
which households that receive digital service could purchase on an a la carte or tiered
basis while the households that get analog service continue to purchase on a tiered
basis, is likely to benefit consumers.10  While today approximately 40% of cable
households (and all satellite households) subscribe to digital service, that penetration
level will increase over time as households migrate to the new digital technology and
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11  The mandate is in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-171).
12  “Economic rents” are payments made to a factor that are in excess of what is required to
elicit the supply of that factor.
13  According to the Initial Report, however, Commission staff re-ran the Booz Allen model
with the modified assumption that the cash flow of program networks was limited to 10%
of revenues, and the results still showed the need to substantially increase subscriber fees.
See the Initial Report at p. 91.  This might suggest that the efficiency losses from an a la
carte regime might overwhelm any reduction in economic rents.  But, as discussed below,
this result may be the consequence of the implicit assumption in the Booz Allen study that
any reduction in compensation to programmers would reduce program quality.
will reach 100% when the digital television transition is completed in 2009, as
mandated by law.11 
Points of Contention
What are the implications of the assumptions in the Booz
Allen study that the program networks and cable and satellite
operators could raise prices as needed to maintain their cash
flow and that current levels of compensation are needed to
maintain program quality?
Two key assumptions in the Booz Allen study are that both the program
networks and the cable/satellite operators would take any pricing actions necessary
to maintain their current cash flow if they were required to offer a la carte pricing or
small tiers.  In the model, to the extent that mandatory a la carte or small tier
offerings would cause a decrease in advertising revenues and/or an increase in costs
for program networks, those networks would be “made whole” by a commensurate
increase in the subscriber fees charged to operators.  In turn, operators would be
made whole for any decrease in advertising revenues and increase in subscriber fees
and other costs by commensurate increases in the prices subscribers pay for both a
la carte and tiered options.  These constant cash flow assumptions appear to preclude
one of the potential benefits of a la carte pricing – creating market forces that might
place downward pressure on program pricing at both the wholesale and retail level.
This is significant because it is widely recognized that, while large tiers represent a
potentially efficient way to distribute programming and may well result in consumer
benefits, they also provide a way for networks to price discriminate, which is often
an effective way for most of the benefits to flow to programmers (as what economists
call “producer surplus”) rather than to  consumers (“consumer surplus”).  That is,
although the large tiers appear to provide an efficient marketing and distribution
platform, they also may increase the ability of producers of “must have” television
programming to squeeze additional “economic rents”12 from consumers.13    
 The Booz Allen model further assumes that any decrease in network revenues
would reduce program quality, which appears to be based on the implicit
presumption that the talent creating the programming must continue to earn current
levels of compensation or program quality would fall.  But that talent (athletes,
actors, directors, producers) today earns economic rents that might be eroded without
CRS-8
14  For example, in the March 25, 2004 Senate Commerce Committee Hearing on Escalating
Cable Rates: Causes and Solutions, James Robbins of Cox Communications stated that he
opposed any requirement that cable operators be required to offer networks on an a la carte
basis, but that Cox would consider offering a separate sports tier.  In that hearing, Mark
Goldstein, director of physical infrastructure at the Government Accountability Office,
indicated that sports programming represents the best choice of programming for a separate
tier.
15  Interestingly, although programming of major sports is viewed by cable and satellite
operators as “must have” programming, the sports programmers report financial losses from
winning the rights to these major sports.  For example, News Corp. reported on February 12,
2002 that it took a $909 million operating charge in the second quarter because of its three
major professional sports television contracts.  According to Steve Sternberg, senior vice
president and broadcast research director at TN Media: “There’s a cachet to having sports,
especially major sports.  They’re like a loss leader.  Sports promote the networks’ primetime
lineups and sports are one of the things that drive people to their internet sites.”  Sports
programmers apparently have made the strategic business decision to get into a competitive
bidding environment to attain the rights to popular sports events even with the knowledge
that, if they win the bid, they would be unlikely to recoup those costs directly from the
sports programming shown.  Rather, sports programmers may expect to benefit indirectly
by exploiting the sports events to market their other programming to the highly desirable
teenage and young adult male audience – both by cross-marketing their other programs and
by “branding” their networks.  Those programmers, of course, seek to recover as much of
the costs as possible from program distributors – through the very high per subscriber fee
imposed on cable operators and, for those sports programmers that own broadcast networks,
through attempts to get their local stations affiliates to share the cost burden.
harming program quality.  Such erosion would be beneficial to consumers.  For
example, if market forces imposed limits on how much cable and broadcast networks
could bid for the rights to baseball, basketball, and football games, club owners might
not be able to maintain the current salary structure for athletes.  But one might expect
that virtually all of those athletes are likely to continue to play their sport at, say, half
of their current salary, because that level would still far exceed what they could earn
in any alternative occupation.  
The Booz Allen study chose not to address another potential impact of a la carte
pricing on economic rents.  The study combines sports networks and general
entertainment networks into a single network category (because some general
entertainment networks offer some sports programming).  But the subscriber fees
charged for sports networks are many multiples of those for any other networks,
including general entertainment networks.  When the sports network fees are
imposed on all subscribers to the expanded basic tier, those households that do not
view the sports networks are almost certainly subsidizing sports viewers.  Even some
critics of mandatory a la carte pricing have conceded that a separate sports tier, or a
la carte pricing of sports networks, might well benefit consumers overall.14  Since the
two FCC reports rely on the Booz Allen study, they were not able to address the
impact of requiring separate sports tiers or a la carte pricing of sports networks on
overall costs to households or on program diversity (i.e., whether the inclusion of
sports programming on a large tier increases revenues that are used to support diverse
programming or simply generates revenues that flow back to talent as economic
rents).15
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16  Booz Allen study at pp. 26-27 and 30.
17  According to the Booz Allen study (at p. 27), cable networks with lower distribution
historically have generated less advertising revenues per rating point than those that have
coverage of 50% to 70% of households.
18  Booz Allen study at p. 49.
19  Booz Allen study at p. 51.
20  See the Further Report at p. 24.
Do the Booz Allen study and Initial Report overstate the
extent to which an a la carte requirement would reduce
advertising revenues, as the Further Report alleges?
The Booz Allen study (and hence also the Initial Report) assume that an a la
carte requirement would substantially reduce the advertising revenues of both
program networks and cable/satellite operators for several reasons16 – overall
television viewing would fall because a la carte viewers would have more limited
options for channel surfing; advertisers value potential audience reach as well as
actual audience size and with a la carte no network would have as much potential
reach since some households would no longer receive the network signal;17 with a
smaller average audience viewing each cable spot advertisement, advertisers would
need to increase the number of cable spots purchased to reach the same audience, but
this increases the risk of viewer “wear out” when a viewer sees too many repetitions
of an advertisement; overall, cable advertising would be a less effective medium.  
Based on these arguments, the Booz Allen study assumes that program networks
would suffer a 10 to 20% decrease in advertising revenues per rating point that,
coupled with a significant decrease in rating points as viewership falls, would result
in a 20 to 30% decrease in advertising revenues.  Under the assumptions of the
model, this revenue loss would have to be countered by a dollar for dollar increase
in subscription fees.18  Similarly, it assumes a la carte pricing would result in a 13 to
23% reduction in local advertising revenues generated by the cable/satellite
operators.19  The model assumes that the operators would have to increase the a la
carte prices charged to households (and, to a lesser extent, the tiered prices charged
to households) to compensate for the increased costs associated with higher
subscription fees and lower local advertising revenues.  Thus the model’s
assumptions about the impact of a la carte pricing on advertising revenues have a
significant impact on the a la carte prices charged and on the number of a la carte
channels a household could purchase without paying more than under the current
tiered system.
While there is merit to the Booz Allen analysis as far as it goes, it fails to
recognize possible countervailing impacts of a la carte pricing on the advertising
market that have been identified by others.  A la carte pricing provides advertisers
with more readily measurable data on the number and demographics of those
households that value a network’s programming sufficiently to purchase it.20
Especially given that Nielsen Market Research does not currently collect ratings data
for the vast majority of small cable networks, the data provided by a list of actual
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purchasers could foster advertising on some of those networks.  Also, under a la
carte, networks might have an opportunity to raise advertising rates to advertisers of
specialty products related to niche programming who seek a select audience with a
high intensity of demand for the niche programming and for the specialty products
advertised.  Thus, it may well be that the Booz Allen study and Initial Report
overstate the negative impact that a la carte pricing may have on both program
networks and operators and, hence, the extent to which that effect might raise a la
carte prices.  It is not possible to estimate how significant this possible overstatement
might be, but it suggests that the “breakeven” number of a la carte networks might
be greater than indicated by the Booz Allen study or Initial Report.
Do the Booz Allen study and the Initial Report overstate the
extent to which a la carte pricing would decrease average
television viewing per household, as the Further Report
alleges?
The Further Notice claims that the Booz Allen study and Initial Report assume
“without any basis, that a shift to a la carte would cause consumers to watch more
than 2 hours less television per day.  That is, the study assumes consumers would
watch nearly 25% less television....”21  
This claim misinterprets the Initial Report.  The Initial Report assumes that,
overall, viewing of advertiser-supported networks would decrease by 23% because
under an a la carte option fewer households would receive each of these networks,
so casual viewing would be eliminated.  At the same time, it assumes that households
would increase their hours of viewing of those advertiser-supported networks they
purchase on an a la carte basis, of the local broadcast networks carried by their cable
or satellite operator, and of premium networks, pay-per-view networks, and video on
demand.  Although the Booz Allen study does not measure what those additional
hours would be, it is assumed that total viewing would decrease but by significantly
less than 23%.  Thus, while one could challenge the assumption that viewing of
advertiser-supported networks would fall 23%, the general thrust of this criticism of
the Further Report does not appear to be accurate.
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Do the Booz Allen study and the Initial Report overstate the
additional marketing costs imposed by an a la carte
requirement, as the Further Report alleges?
The Booz Allen study assumes that, under mandatory a la carte pricing, on
average advertiser-supported cable networks would have to increase their marketing
expenditures from the 2-6% of total net revenues they are today to 15-25% of total
net revenues.22  The study claims that marketing expenditures are relatively small
today because the networks can focus their marketing activities on reaching operators
and can partner with those operators to market to viewers.  Once a network is carried
by a cable or satellite operator on the expanded basic tier, marketing to viewers is
relatively limited because channel surfing is costless to the networks and cross-
network marketing within the tier is a relatively low cost activity.  Under a la carte,
however, the marketing focus would have to shift to marketing directly to consumers.
Reaching non-subscribers and convincing them to pay for a network poses a more
significant challenge than most networks face today.  Networks cannot gain viewers
from among non-subscribers from channel surfing, and cross-network marketing is
not efficient if the subscriber does not have immediate access to the second network
(as it would have on the tier).  Thus the marketing task, Booz Allen argues, is more
akin to the marketing challenges of premium channels (such as HBO) and of
consumer packaged goods companies.  Those companies spend approximately 15-
27% of their product revenues on marketing.
The Further Report challenges this assumption.  It cites a study by the Cable and
Telecommunications Association for Marketing that found that less than half of
viewers find new channels through channel surfing, and thus argues that “networks
are already confronting the problem of marketing themselves to non-surfers, even
with bundling.”23
This criticism is also open to challenge.  Networks today do a lot of cross-
network marketing.  The efficiencies from such marketing is one of the market forces
fostering the creation of brand identities and families of networks (ESPN, Discovery,
FOX, etc.).  Independent networks focus their marketing efforts on getting onto
expanded basic tiers, not on consumer households.  Virtually all the independent
networks that filed comments in the FCC proceeding stated they would face very
difficult marketing burdens in an a la carte environment.  In addition to the costs of
initially capturing paying viewers, cable networks would have to spend money to
retain customers.  There is general agreement that customer “churn” is lower for a
bundle of services than for individually-sold services.  All of these factors suggest
that the Booz Allen study and the Initial Report made reasonable assumptions about
the increase in marketing expenses if a la carte pricing were mandatory. 
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Is the methodological correction to the Booz Allen study
proposed and calculated in the Further Report the
appropriate correction?
There are two key calculations in the Booz Allen study.  First, the price that the
cable/satellite operator would charge for each a la carte advertiser-supported network
is calculated.  This is done by increasing current average video revenues per
household ($55) by the percentage needed to recover the new programming,
customer service, and other costs associated with a la carte pricing, then subtracting
from that amount those revenues that are not generated by advertiser-supported
networks (i.e., revenues generated from set top box rentals, premium networks, pay-
per-view and video on demand services, and the broadcast channels offered over the
basic tier).  This figure is then divided by 11 – the average number of advertiser-
supported networks viewed per household in a week – to obtain the a la carte price
per network that the operator would charge to maintain its cash flow level.  The
second calculation attempts to determine the “breakeven” number of advertiser-
supported networks that a household would purchase to keep its total spending at
$55.  This is calculated by subtracting from $55 all of the revenues that are not
generated by advertiser-supported networks, and then dividing that figure by the a la
carte price generated in the first calculation.
In 2005 (more than a year after the Initial Report had been released), the FCC
staff noticed that the Booz Allen study had incorporated a methodological error by
failing to exclude the revenues generated from the broadcast channels, premium
channels, and pay-per-view and video on demand services from the first calculation.
The Further Report claims that, upon correcting for this error, the model shows that,
on average, those households that already have digital service would have lower costs
under an a la carte regime because the a la carte price would be lower and thus
households could purchase more than 11 a la carte networks without paying more
than $55.24 
But in a letter that Booz Allen sent to the FCC after being informed of the
methodological error, but before the Further Report had been released,25 Booz Allen
explained that it had made the same methodological error – failing to exclude the
revenues generated from the broadcast channels, premium channels, and pay-per-
view and video on demand services – in the second calculation and that therefore the
same correction had to be made to the second calculation as well.  It further stated
that when the corrections were made in both calculations the results were almost
identical to those in its original study:
When both these adjustments are made, the estimated number of cable channels
that a consumer would be able to purchase on an a la carte basis does not differ
significantly from the results in our 2004 report.  The 2004 report estimated that
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digital customers would be able to purchase 7 to 9 a la carte cable channels,
while analog customers would be able to purchase 6 to 7.  Making the two
offsetting adjustments results in a range of 8 to 10 channels for digital customers,
and 6 to 8 channels for analog customers.
The Further Report does not make any mention of this second methodological error
and it appears that it did not correct for this error.26  Booz Allen is correct that the
correction must be made in both calculations.  Thus, this criticism in the Further
Report does not appear to have merit.
Do the Booz Allen study and the Initial Report overstate the
extent to which a la carte pricing would decrease program
diversity, as the Further Report alleges?
The Booz Allen study claims that mandating a la carte pricing would lead to less
diverse programming than today and that the reduction would be larger the greater
the number of households that migrate to a la carte.27  It assumes that the program
networks’ substantial reductions in advertising revenues and increases in marketing
costs would force them to significantly raise subscriber fees charged to operators and
that the operators, in turn, would have to charge a la carte customers between $4 and
$5 per network.  They conclude that emerging networks, in particular, would not be
able to attract sufficiently large audiences in this environment to survive, projecting
that half to three-quarters of emerging networks would fail under a la carte and that
new network launches would be extremely rare.  Based on this analysis, the Initial
Report concludes that “many program networks [may] fail, thus adversely affecting
diversity.  The most likely to feel the brunt of such a mandate would be networks
serving small niche interests, such as religious programming, programming aimed
at minority interests, arts programming, and independently owned networks.”28 
The Further Report questions these conclusions,29 claiming that “a la carte could
be preferable to bundling in providing diverse programming responsive to consumer
demand” for two reasons.  First, it agues that because their goal is to maximize the
price and sales of the bundle, cable and satellite operators in many circumstances will
have an incentive not to provide networks that have programs similar to existing
programming, even if that programming would be valued by many customers.  For
example, some mainstream networks might not be carried because they might not
increase total subscribership as much as a unique niche network might.  Second,
bundling can obscure signals regarding consumer valuations of individual networks.
The first argument would seem relevant if the public policy goal were to best meet
consumer demand, even if to do so would expand general interest programming at
the expense of diverse programming.  But diversity of voices is a fundamental goal
of U.S. media policy and the Further Report does not refute the fact that niche
networks could be significantly harmed by a la carte pricing.  The second argument
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31  On the other hand, very low a la carte prices for some networks would place downward
pressure on the per subscriber fees those networks charge operators and thus could
undermine the viability of those networks.
32  As long as networks have been provided to consumers on a tiered basis, without
individual prices, such data are not available.
33  In their contracts with operators, the program networks insist on strict non-disclosure
clauses and the FCC has not required parties to provide such data, even under strict
confidentiality agreements.
has merit to the extent that certain niche programming with small audiences that have
high intensity of demand and demographics favorable to advertisers might benefit
from an a la carte approach.  But overall, due to the scale economies associated with
program networks, niche networks tend to be placed at a disadvantage in an a la carte
market.
At the same time, the conclusions in the Booz Allen study appear to be
overstated.  Those conclusions are based on assumed a la carte prices of $4 to $5 per
network generated by that study.  Although the subsequent corrections to the Booz
Allen study continued to show that under a la carte pricing most households would
receive fewer networks for the same price, they also yielded significantly lower a la
carte prices – in the range of $2.54 to $3.37.  The prices for niche networks and new
networks would certainly be well below those averages.30  Thus, Booz Allen’s
pessimistic projection that half to three quarters of emerging networks would fail,
which is based in part on inflated $4 to $5 a la carte prices, appears to be an
overstatement.31  
Nonetheless, it is true that requiring households to commit to $2.50 per month
or more for a new network, sight unseen, is likely to impede demand for new
networks and make it especially difficult for independent networks that do not have
any opportunity to “introduce” some of their programming on an existing sibling
network (as a new Discovery or ESPN or FOX  network would be able to do). 
Can specific conclusions be reached from the two FCC
Reports?
In the absence of key empirical information – on households’ elasticity and
intensity of demand for particular types of program networks,32 program networks’
license fees for providing networks on an a la carte vs. tiered basis,33 and cable and
satellite operators’ retail charges for providing networks in an a la carte vs. tiered
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35  For example, during the question and answer portion of the March 25, 2004 Senate
Commerce Committee hearing, Cox Communications president James Robbins stated that
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demand” model with most programming provided on an a la carte basis.  But, he stated that
was a future business model that could not be implemented until the industry undertook an
additional $30 billion in needed capital investment.
36  Subscribers to digital cable (and satellite) typically have access to many more tiers than
do analog subscribers, and increasingly have access to video on demand services, but
operators generally charge monthly fees for these capabilities.  For example, Echostar
charges a $5.00 monthly service access fee to all accounts that do not subscribe to one of
its basic programming packages and also charges a $5.00 transaction fee for removing
programming or for changing from one like-priced package to another. 
fashion34 – none of the studies or reports issued to date can be deemed definitive,
though an a la carte approach could have serious implications for diversity.  Large
tiers generally benefit those households that prefer a wide variety of programming
and/or niche programming, while a la carte pricing generally benefits those
households that watch only a small number of networks and prefer general interest
programming.  Requiring operators to offer all options might not meet the needs of
all households, however, because the migration of some threshold number of
households to a la carte pricing could undermine the economic feasibility of large
tiers.  
Are Market Forces Likely to Affect the Program
Networks’ Current Tiered Business Model?
Most observers agree that technological change is likely to precipitate new
market dynamics and that ultimately the tiered business model currently employed
by the large programmers will give way to a video on demand approach that is akin
to a la carte pricing.35  But that change will not take place immediately and, indeed,
there remain questions about how programmers will be able to construct a viable
video on demand business plan.  For example, how will the literally hundreds of
thousands of programming options be marketed and priced?  And what tools will
consumers have to efficiently track down their choices among the huge available
inventory?  In the interim, the entry of competing distribution avenues – through
telephone company broadband services or even Internet video streaming – may
strengthen the negotiating position of programmers vis-a-vis distributors and may
allow programmers to retain tiering for the foreseeable future.
Multiple tiers and a la carte pricing impose higher transactional costs – to
restrict access to those networks the household chooses to purchase and to bill
households for their selections – that deter demand.  Those subscribers that already
purchase digital service or pay-per-view service have set-top boxes that could readily
accommodate these transactional tasks.36  But more than half of all cable subscribers
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continue to receive analog cable service37 and these customers would require set-top
boxes (which rent for approximately $4.50 per television set) in a multiple-tier or a
la carte environment.38  Two-television households that would have to pay an
additional $9.00 monthly for set-top boxes are unlikely to see savings from multiple-
tier or a la carte pricing.  
But the migration of households from analog to digital customer premises
equipment is likely to be sped up with the statutorily mandated February 17, 2009
deadline for the conversion from analog to digital broadcast television.39  In addition,
there are a number of technological changes that are likely to foster multiple tiers and
a la carte pricing from both a supply-side and a demand-side perspective.  Most
prominently, the development and deployment of Internet protocol television (IPTV)
– already being deployed by some telephone companies and likely to be deployed in
the future by both telephone companies and cable companies – will allow broadband
providers to offer subscribers access to individual programs or blocks of programs
on an on-demand basis through set-top boxes that call up a particular program rather
than requiring the broadband provider to “broadcast” all the programming to the
household. 
Moreover, new technologies such as digital video recorders (DVRs, such as
TiVo), which allow consumers to better control the timing and choice of their
programming viewing, are creating a demand for programming more closely attuned
to individual customer tastes, which tends to be consistent with an a la carte or video
on demand approach.  Also, recent deals between various programmers and Internet
applications and equipment providers, which allow customers to download individual
first-run programs for a fixed charge, is creating a demand for a la carte-like program
access and pricing.
A key market development is the entry of both large and small telephone
companies into the video market, sometimes using IPTV technology.  These new
entrants intend to compete with the cable companies for the triple play provision of
voice, video, and data services.  Given the first-into-market advantages of the cable
and satellite video providers, the telephone companies may seek to compete by using
a different business model, with multiple smaller tiers or a la carte options – and even
video on demand – made possible by the new technologies they are deploying. 
Unlike many of the large cable and satellite companies that are vertically
integrated into program networks and even program production,40 however, the
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2003 (table entitled Cable Networks Owned, By Number Owned: May 2004), Time Warner
has total or significant ownership interest in 13 large advertiser-supported cable networks
and the largest premium network and also owns the largest film and television studios;
DirecTV’s parent, News Corp., has total or significant ownership interest in 7 large
advertiser-supported cable networks and numerous regional sports networks, owns the Fox
broadcast television network, and owns the fourth largest film and television studios; Disney
has total or significant ownership interest in 16 large advertiser-supported cable networks
and numerous regional sports networks, owns the ABC broadcast television network, and
owns the second largest film and television studios; Comcast has total or significant
ownership interest in five large advertising-supported cable networks and numerous regional
sports networks; Cablevision has total or significant ownership in six large advertising-
supported cable networks; Cox has a minority interest in 12 large advertising-supported
cable networks. 
41  “Verizon Seeks FCC Intervention to Free Cablevision’s Stranglehold on Sports
Programming,” Verizon News Release, available at [http://newscenter
.verizon.com/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=93328], viewed on March 29, 2006.
telephone companies have no ownership ties to cable networks or program
production.  They face the simultaneous tasks of building out networks and obtaining
content that will attract viewers away from incumbent cable and satellite operators.
Although they can expect to obtain programming from independent programmers that
now have difficulty gaining access to cable tiers, those independent programmers do
not have the “must have” programming – such as sports and popular entertainment
programming – that consumers demand from their multi-channel video providers.
In fact, on March 21, 2006, Verizon filed a formal access complaint with the FCC,
seeking to secure access to the sports programming of Rainbow Media Holdings, a
subsidiary of Cablevision Systems for Verizon’s television customers in New York
and New England.41  Verizon alleges that Rainbow had refused to negotiate a carriage
agreement with Verizon for Rainbow’s regional sports networks.  By adding a
competitive distributor to the market, telephone company entry may, at least initially,
improve the negotiating position of the large programmers (with their “must-have”
programming) and reinforce their large tier business model.  
Still, by providing independent content providers an alternative way to reach
households, if the telephone companies can gain market share sufficient to generate
the revenues needed to support themselves and the independent programmers,
telephone company entry might quickly erode the large tier business model.
Moreover, the large program providers, who rank piracy of their programs as a major
business concern, might determine that successful a la carte or on-demand offerings
by IPTV-based telephone companies could reduce piracy of their programs.
